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1 Introduction
Compared with the 1980s, the World Bank has
now adopted a more comprehensive conception of
the state. However, its conception, as presented in
the 1997 World Development Report, remains lim-
ited and biased in some important respects. This
article reflects on the conception of the state in
WDR97; its limitations; and their implications for
the recommendations of the Report about strate-
gies for institutional development. The article crit-
icises the Report for not taking sufficiently into
account the varying forms of societal embedded-
ness of states and for looking at the role of states
from a too narrow perspective of economic
effectiveness and efficiency
This article takes into account the mandate of the
World Bank, that stipulates that only economic
considerations shall guide its decisions on lending.1
However, in its analytical work the Bank has for
many years taken a broader view - not to the extent
of taking a firm stand on the appropriate form of
regime or similar political matters, but at least to
the extent of expressing views on the appropriate
role of the state and on the nature of the institu-
tions that promote or obstruct development. A line
is drawn, therefore, between criticism of the Report
within this interpretation of the mandate and criti-
cism that goes beyond it to incorporate considera-
tions on how to promote democratic development
in recipient countries. The latter perspective is
deemed relevant for many bilateral donors. It is
included here to highlight an important area where
the Report has little to offer, but where bilateral
donors have already prepared or may wish to elab-
orate their own strategies for institutional
development.
In the course of the discussion I present sweeping
statements - essentially at the same level of aggre-
gation and abstraction as those presented in the
Report. The theoretical foundation for these state-
ments has not been included here. I take the liberty
of referring the interested reader to my review and
Article IV, section 10 of the World Bank's Articles
states: The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the
political affairs of any member; nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of
the members concerned. Only economic considerations
shall be relevant to their decisions . .
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examination of development theories in a recently
publïshed book.
It should be noted from the outset that the article
presents critical views on the Report mainly based
on knowledge about South Asia and some countries
in South East Asia and East Africa.
2 The Contemporary World Bank
Conception of the State
The 1997 Report represents a second phase in the
rethinking of the state within the World Bank, but
it does not contain any review of the previous phase
nor any discussion of reasons for changing the basic
approach and conception of the state. There is no
reflective self-criticism. A review of the history of
Bank thinking is beyond the scope of this article,
but a few points should be highlighted.
During the first phase, i.e. from around 1980 to
1990-91, the emphasis was on questioning the rel-
evance and effectiveness of the state for the
advancement of economic development. The Bank
essentially promoted the neoclassical strategy with
its emphasis on minimising the state's economic
role and reducing the size of the public sector
through privatisation of public undertakings and
relinquishing as many economic tasks as possible to
private companies.
Among Keynesian development economists, this
was perceived as a counter-revolution against the
previously dominant state-managed development
model - a counter-revolution these economists
were ill-prepared to face in theoretical debates
(bye 1987). It was only towards the end of the
1 980s that the neoclassical counter-revolution was
gradually forced onto the defensive, both in the the-
oretical debates and within the World Bank. The
counter-revolution came increasingly to be per-
ceived as a reaction that had gone too far in its crit-
icism of the state-managed development model
(Killick 1989). Instead, a more balanced approach
emerged between the state-managed and the mar-
ket-led model - a compromise which came to set
the agenda for the international debate and
development efforts of the 1990s.
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It is interesting to note how the World Bank com-
menced the 1980s with an almost uncritical pro-
motion of the neoclassical propositions regarding
the rolling back the boundaries of the state, but
ended the decade with an emphasis of the need for
capacity building within core state agencies and the
public sector in general. This was followed by a
nuanced discussion about the best and most feasi-
ble distribution of labour between state and market,
first in the 1991 World Development Report and
two years later in the report entitled 'The East Asian
miracle' (World Bank 1993). WDR97 takes this sec-,
ond phase in the rethinking of the state several
steps further by discussing how to improve the
effectiveness of the state, based on the explicit
notion that the state has an important role to play
The Report contains no simple propositions about
minimising the state. Instead, the focus is on
matching the role of the state with its capability in
the short term and building capacity in the longer
term to make the state capable of performing all the
necessary functions assigned to it in the Report.
Markets and governments are now seen as comple-
mentary The whole approach in a sense is both
market-friendly and state-friendly.
The underlying conception of the state may not be
fully coherent and consistent. There is a tendency in
most of the Report to treat the state as a rational
actor, guided only by the common interests of all its
citizens. Most of the recommendations concerning
capacity building and reinvigorating institutional
capabilities are narrowly focused on how to
improve economic effectiveness and efficiency,
based on the critical assumption that the state is pri-
marily a rational actor. But in other parts - espe-
cially when discussing obstacles to the
implementation of reform - the state is regarded as
both an actor and an institutional framework for
resolving conflicts of interest. As an actor in this
context, the state is seen as functioning in accor-
dance with the most powerful groups, possibly
reflecting a compromise between their vital interests
and those of other groups of society It follows from
this second conception that the crucial question is
not merely to work out the 'best' policies but rather
to work out the 'best possible' policies within the
framework of the existing power structure.
John Martinussen, 1997, Society, State and Market. London and New York: Zed Books.
A Guide to Competing Theories of Development,
There is need for further rethinking of the state
along these lines in order for the Bank to arrive at
more realistic institutional development strategies
adapted to the varying conditions in recipient coun-
tries. This and other limitations in the Banks con-
ception of the state, as presented in the Report, are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
3 Limitations in the Bank's
Conception of the State
The analyses of the state remain constrained by a
narrow economic perspective which prevents the
Bank from really understanding the 'popularity' of
the state-managed development model - the rea-
sons for its emergence and continued existence in
many developing countries. The attempts at
explaining this 'popularity' in the Report simply
refer to 'strong beliefs in state-dominated economic
development' and 'economic nationalism' (p.23). To
these observations should be added, however, some
fundamental non-economic reasons for the adop-
tion of the state-managed model right after inde-
pendence in most African and several Asian
countries.
The political leaders in most of the newly indepen-
dent societies had little choice if they wanted to stay
in power. Markets were undeveloped and the polit-
ical elites had no power over them. They were in no
position to govern the markets along similar lines as
in the high-performing East Asian economies.
Instead, in order to maintain power, they were
forced to enter into a close alliance with the civil
bureaucracy and the military Through this alliance
the political leaders as personal rulers achieved con-
trol over significant public resources which they
could use to build political support. This system of
political patronage continues to dominate in a large
number of poor countries. Its important role as
foundation for political power, even in societies
with formal democratic procedures, is a major rea-
son for the continued 'popularity' of the state-gov-
erned model among rulers (Jackson & Rosberg
1982; Sandbrook 1985; Bates 1988).
These and other non-economic explanations are
important, because they reveal critical aspects of the
wider institutional setting in which government
bureaucracies operate, and at the same time they
identify significant obstacles to the kind of reform
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initiatives proposed in WDR97. It is interesting to
note that the practices of personal rule and political
patronage prevail in societies with weak predatory
states whose capacity to promote economic devel-
opment is extremely limited (Evans 1989). From
the perspective of economic effectiveness, these
states are in particular need of reform, but they are
also the least likely to undergo any kind of political
or administrative reform. Contrary to developmen-
tal states, weak predatory states are not constituted
chiefly with a view to promote economic growth
and socially shared development. Rather, their
major function is to provide a foundation for the
exercise of political power. Internal and external
security considerations are important even in
industrially more advanced countries such as India,
Pakistan and Indonesia. This needs to be taken into
account when considering the political feasibility of
economic reform and strategies for their
implementation.
In more general terms, aspects of societal embed-
dedness - such as those referred to above - must
be taken much more into consideration than is
done in the Report in order to understand what
shapes the behaviour of governments and why they
behave so differently WDR97 contains a few refer-
ences to culture, history, informal rules and norms
(e.g. in Figure 2.1, p.30), but such non-economic
issues are not brought into the analyses and recom-
mendations on institutional development strategies.
It is further recognised in general terms that 'state
institutions have deep roots in society' (p.l57), but
again this recognition is not systematically reflected
in the strategies proposed.
Another set of limitations in the Report's concep-
tion of the state relates to its role in societal devel-
opment. The focus here is mostly on effectiveness
and efficiency in relation to economic growth, with
particular emphasis on the role of the state in the
provision of public and collective goods and ser-
vices. There are additional references to the role of
the state in areas like protecting vulnerable people
and the environment, but such tasks have not been
systematically integrated into the institutional
development strategies. Moreover, the Report has
left out essentially all non-economic tasks, includ-
ing national integration (nation building), social
cohesion (briefly referred to only once, p.89), and
political stability This is somewhat surprising even
from the narrow economic perspective adopted in
the Report, because it is repeatedly argued that
political stability and 'credibility' are very important
for private investment. I would go a step further
and propose that the 'sustainable, shared, poverty-
reducing development' aimed at in the Report (p.4)
is impossible to achieve without a certain amount of
national integration, social cohesion, and political
stability and governability. All this cannot be sub-
sumed simply under the heading of 'establishing a
foundation of law'.
4 Implications for Institutional
Development Strategies
The guiding principles in WDR97 of matching the
state's role to its capability in the short term and rais-
ing state capability by reinvigorating public institu-
tions in the longer term may appear captivating, but
they also call for at least two critical remarks.
First, many states in developing countries are so
weak that reducing their tasks to what they can
presently do effectively would imply dismantling
them as states. It would imply pursuing the previ-
ously recommended strategy of minimising the
state. The attention drawn in the Report to resource
utilisation and better management of public
resources is a commendable supplement to the
focus on resource allocation prevailing in much
economic theory, but to take the resources presently
available to the state as given is to go too far in that
direction. An alternative strategy; therefore, would
give first priority to strengthening the state's
resource base and resource mobilisation capabilities
and would accept that the state would have to con-
tinue doing what it is attempting to do, but to do it
more efficiently Simultaneously, steps should be
taken to build the capabilities for more effective and
efficient resource utilisation. This does not preclude
privatisation and other measures to reduce the size
and role of the state. The point is that such mea-
sures cannot be justified exclusively with reference
to poor performance of existing government insti-
tutions, particularly when poor performance is pri-
marily due to lack of resources.
Second, reinvigorating public institutions in many
cases would be far from sufficient. The terminology
used here seems to imply that states and public
institutions in general were previously more
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capable of performing their roles. A more appropri-
ate formulation would refer to invigorating public
institutions and assist in building their capabilities.
One chapter in the Report (Chapter 10) explicitly
discusses the different opportunities and challenges
facing states in each 'developing region'. Yet, in
most of the Report, states are treated as a standard-
ised commodity As a corollary, essentially the same
'cure' - the same set of strategies for their develop-
ment - is proposed. This appears in the main text
as well as in boxes in the form of general proposi-
tions and frequent references to the approaches
adopted by the high-performing East Asian
economies, and even with references to New
Zealand and other OECD countries where New
Public Management ideas have been practised.
I very much doubt this is a feasible approach. The
differences are simply too significant. Consider the
differences, for instance, between, on the one hand,
the South Korean state with a well-developed
coherent bureaucracy, and on the other, many
African countries where non-institutionalised gov-
ernment prevails, where persons and social net-
works take precedence over rules, and where
paramount leaders rule more in their personal
capacity than in their capacity as office-holders
within the formal governmental set-up.
Poor countries with weak states may undoubtedly
learn from rich countries with strong states, but not
necessarily by trying to become similar in all, or
even most, respects. That would depend critically
on the extent to which they face the same kind of
challenges and the degree to which they can build
on similar strengths. Besides, the sequencing of
reform initiatives is extremely important. These
issues are not really dealt with in the Report. Rather,
the same sequencing is proposed in all cases, begin-
ning with the 'matching' exercise which, as indi-
cated above, for several weak states would imply
abolishing even some of the core government
functions.
In more specific terms, WDR97 is lacking in its pro-
posed strategies particularly for two reasons: the
underlying assumptions about the existence of
strong private sector partners; and the implied
hypothesis that actual practices can be changed by
changing formal rules and procedures.
The Report tends to overestimate the strengths and
capabilities of non-state institutions and organi-
sations. This is reflected in the high confidence in
the market which the Report retains from previous
World Bank publications. By asking what institu-
tional arrangements best allow markets to flourish
(e.g. p.29), attention is drawn to the framework but
not to the actors, the consumers and the private
sector companies. The faith in the non-state institu-
tions and organisations is even more pronounced in
the proposed strategies for contracting out (pp.80,
880; and regarding the establishment of delibera-
tion councils. It is assumed here that firms exist
with a capacity to take over delivery of goods and
services, and that firms and associations have been
established with capabilities to enter into consulta-
tions with the government.
These strategies, however, are only feasible where
the private sector has been developed beyond a cer-
tain threshold. This is not the case in the large
majority of developing countries. The Report con-
tains a good observation on this issue: 'If a country's
private sector is small, deliberation councils can all
too easily degenerate into well-oiled mechanisms
for unproductive rent extraction'.(p.83). This is
used to explain why African versions of deliberative
councils have generally been ineffective. I agree. But
it is more difficult than that. Even in India, with a
strong private sector, attempts at building an insti-
tutional framework for co-operation between the
government and the private sector have so far failed
to reach beyond a series of narrowly focused and
non-transparent consultations.
Coming to the second point regarding the empha-
sis on formal rules and procedures, the idea of
adjusting the incentive structures and thereby
change the behaviour of government officials is
basically sound - but not sufficient. It puts too
much emphasis on formal institutions and proce-
dures within government and largely ignores the
fact that personalistic relationships permeate both
the government bureaucracies and those of the pri-
vate companies. In this sense, the same society-gen-
erated and very basic social institutions and norms
have invaded and captured both the state and the
firms and thus effectively influence intra-bureau-
cracy and intra-firm behaviour, as well as the inter-
actions between bureaucracy and the firms (North
1990). This is less so in some high-performing East
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Asian economies and may be less so with respect to
transnational corporations, but the practice is not
confined to Africa. Personalistic relationships tend
to dominate in the whole of South Asia (Blomkvist
1988) and even in a high performing economy a
such as Indonesia's - irrespective of formal rules.
The narrow focus on formal procedures is found
also in the discussion of how to restrain arbitrary
state action and corruption. It is very commendable
that WDR97 touches on these matters, but the
remedies suggested - the introduction of more for-
mal checks and balances - are highly inappropriate.
They reflect either insufficient understanding of the
more profound reasons for corruption and rent
seeking, or unwillingness on the part of the Bank to
consider the wider institutional setting within
which governments in most developing countries
function.
lt is correct that corruption - defined in the Report
as the abuse of public power for private gain (p.
102) - is facilitated by wide discretionary powers
vested in government officials, little formal account-
ability, and low salary levels (p. 103f.). But the root
causes should be sought outside the state - in the
long-established practices of reciprocal exchange -
what some researchers have termed the moral econ-
omy, others the economy of affection (Hyden 1983;
Hyden & Bratton 1992). The basic feature is the
moral obligation to favour and reward one's own
family, kin, community or other kinds of social
groups. This may imply the abuse of public power
and resources, precisely because many government
officials in poor countries feel a stronger obligation
towards external groups than to the state. The
strategies proposed by the Report may contribute to
narrowing the scope for such corrupt practices, but
it needs to be acknowledged as a much more diffi-
cult problem to solve in countries like those in sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and elsewhere. Again
what is needed is a more comprehensive analysis of
the societal embeddedriess of the behaviour of gov-
ernment officials.
To this should be added that effectiveness and effi-
ciency cannot be treated as socially neutral. It may
be at the margin of the Bank's mandate, but it has
become part of the tradition among donors to
expect from the Bank special considerations con-
cerning the poor. These are lacking in most of the
Report. Improving delivery needs to be tackled in a
differentiating manner - as seen from the perspec-
tive of the rich as well as from the perspective of the
poor. And it is evidently more costly for the state to
deliver services to the poor, who cannot contribute
financially, or only marginally so. This issue is only
dealt with sporadically throughout the Report. It is
not systematically integrated into the recommenda-
tions on institutional development strategies. This
is particularly evident in the discussion of external
pressure as a means to improve performance (p.86
fD. The outcome in social terms depends very much
on the kinds of external pressure, and it is generally
the case that the resource-weak segments of the
population are in a bad position to exert any major
pressure on the state agencies and are even worse
off when it comes to exerting pressure against com-
mercial undertakings. Pressure from the poor to get
access to water, for instance, is rarely effective. To
this could be added that external pressure on agen-
cies responsible for delivery may often imply ethnic
or regional biases. In other words, external pressure
- although in principle one of the available means
to enhance performance - may in practice result in
socially biased delivery. Again, the underlying
assumptions about society as free of conflicts and
about citizens as a homogeneous group interfere
with the Reports recommendations.
The social biases embodied in institutional arrange-
ments and policies are mentioned in the Report, but
they come in late in the analyses - in Chapter 7 -
where it is noted that the low income or subordi-
nate position of some groups makes them nearly
invisible to public officials (p117). But this correct
observation has not been taken into account sys-
tematically in the strategies proposed in the previ-
ous chapters. The Report as a whole is weak on this
issue.
The Report argues in favour of decentralisation,
especially devolution in accordance with the sub-
sidiarity principle - that public goods and services
should be provided by the lowest level of govern-
ment that can fully capture the costs and benefits
(p. 1200. Consideration is further given to the
matching of services with local preferences. Yet, lit-
tle is said about the possible strategies for
I have dealt more extensively with the issue of
decentralisation, devolution and local-level democracy
in John Martinussen, 1995, Democracy, Competition
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strengthening local authorities in general, and even
less about the strengthening of local-level democ-
racy as an institutional framework for increasing
opportunities for voice and participation - goals
that are otherwise given priority in the Report (p.
116). Instead, attention is turned to the pitfalls of
decentralisation (p. 124ff). Recommendations on
how to strengthen democratically elected local
authorities may go beyond the Bank's mandate, but
the same does not apply to a broader discussion of
how to strengthen local authorities from the per-
spective of improving effectiveness, efficiency, and
the matching of service provision with citizen
preferences.
I suggest that the Bank engage itself more in the
debate on decentralisation with a strong emphasis
on devolution. Moreover, I propose that bilateral
donors add to this a specific democratisation per-
spective that justifies devolution, not chiefly from a
point of view of effectiveness, but also from the
point of view of enhancing citizen participation in
decision-making as an end in itself. This perspec-
tive on devolution might take the considerations
regarding subsidiarity outside the formal govern-
mental set-up and raise the question whether more
services should be provided by development-ori-
ented NGOs or other civil-society organisations.
Devolution per se will not necessarily bring about
improvements in service provision and delivery of
goods as seen from an efficiency point of view, but
when implemented successfully, transfer of power
to local authorities can yield substantial benefits,
both in terms of encouraging greater participation
and improving effectiveness, at least in some areas.3
5 An Additional Agenda for
Bilateral Donor Agencies
In keeping with the World Bank's mandate, institu-
tional development strategies specifically aimed at
promoting democratisation are not considered
explicitly in WDR97. The Report confines itself to
good governance in a broader sense. However,
bilateral donor agencies need not confine them-
selves in the same way, and many of them have
already incorporated into their development objec-
tives some form of democratisation. Most donors
and Choice: Emerging Local Self-Government in
Nepal, New Delhillhousand Oaks/London: Sage
Publications.
combine demands for democratic reforms with
direct assistance to strengthening democratic insti-
tutions. In this sense, bilateral donors have added
to the issue of good governance also that of 'good
politics' by demanding a commitment to democra-
tisation and by providing institutional development
support to that effect. They attempt to promote not
merely the developmental state but also the democ-
ratic developmental state (cf. White 1995).
To promote democratisation requires the introduc-
tion of a set of procedures for competition between
political parties and politicians; good governance
and protection of human rights; devolution; and
empowerment of civil-society organisations. Several
aspects of the institutional development strategies
proposed in WDR97 may be relevant in this con-
text, but bilateral donors need to focus more specif-
ically on interventions in the public sector aimed at
strengthening institutions and institutional relation-
ships of particular importance for the proper func-
tioning of democracy as a form of regime. Relevant
examples from Danish assistance include: assistance
to work out election procedures, to organise
polling, and to improve the working of the parlia-
mentary secretariats. These types of capacity devel-
opment strategies reach beyond effectiveness-
enhancing in the narrow economic sense, to
improving the institutional framework for popular
participation.
Several donor agencies may wish to go even further
in their support for democratisation by providing
assistance to civil society organisations and citizen
associations in general so as to enable them to reach
up to the authorities and to do so on a more equal
basis. Most official development agencies, however,
are in no position to directly empower resource-
poor segments of the population. What they can
and should do is to encourage the governments in
recipient countries to create better institutional
arrangements for dialogue between the authorities
and the citizens, and thereby bring about more and
73
stronger preconditions for the proper functioning of
democracy The strategies to be adopted for this
purpose need to be elaborated in the context of the
societies concerned. The approach appropriate for
India, for instance, would not be particularly rele-
vant for Indonesia. Or to put it in more general
terms, institutional development strategies must
address the particular difficulties and challenges
faced by individual states. We may identify patterns
that allow us to group countries into a smaller num-
ber of categories, each with shared fundamental
needs for institutional strengthening. But we should
avoid repeating the mistakes of neoclassical econo-
mists who suggested the same cure, the same gen-
eral economic development strategy for all, and the
same sequencing of reform initiatives. I would
argue that a differentiating approach is even more
important when it comes to institutional develop-
ment strategies in support of democratisation.
6 ConcJuding Remarks
WDR97 has reinstated firmly on the international
agenda the role of the state in development - not
with notions of the state as the chief engine of
growth, but with notions of the state as a set of
institutions required to provide a framework for
private sector development and the proper func-
tioning of the market. The emphasis in the Report
is on how to improve the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the state in this context. What is required
to complement the analyses in the Report is: a bet-
ter understanding of the variety of ways in which
different states are embedded in societies; a broader
understanding of the non-economic roles of states;
more attention to the social biases embodied in
most institutional arrangements; and the need for
democratisation, not simply to improve perfor-
mance in the economic sense, but rather to improve
performance in a political sense - to promote par-
ticipation for all adult citizens, and responsiveness,
transparency and accountability on the part of the
public authorities.
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